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Drawing the Line: 
‘Scientific’ History between 
Myth-making and Myth-breaking
CHRIS LORENZ, VU AMSTERDAM
In December 1985 William McNeill presented a paper to the American
Historical Association’s annual meeting. At the time McNeill, who had earned
his fame with widely acknowledged books such as The Rise of the West and
Plagues and People, was president of the AHA and one of the pioneers of a
kind of history which has since become known as ‘global history’ or ‘world
history’. The title of his paper was as original as it was enigmatic: ‘Mythistory,
or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians’. Published in the same year as a
chapter in a volume entitled Mythistory and Other Essays, it was original
inasmuch as ‘mythistory’ was a newly coined term, and enigmatic because
history and myth had traditionally been considered by professional historians
to be polar opposites. The dividing line between history and myth had only
recently been questioned by hard-line postmodernists – and McNeill was not
known for his postmodern predilections.1 On the contrary, McNeill was a
serious craftsman if there ever was one, possessing a fine sense for innovation
and for what was going on within the profession. It is hardly surprising, then,
that his prediction that the term ‘mythistory’ would not catch on with his
colleagues turned out to be correct.
Here I will take his article as a point of departure in order to analyse the
fundamental tensions between the two central epistemological and practical
claims made by ‘scientific’ historians for their subject since its beginnings as an
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academic discipline in Europe. The epistemological claim related to the status of
history writing as a Wissenschaft, that is, a methodical truth-seeking discipline:
academic history, above all else, claimed to do away with all myths about the
past and to replace them with The Truth – or, at least, some truths. Accordingly,
academic history had become characterised by its Wissenschaftsanspruch, its
claim to scientificity, although this claim could be based on a wide variety of
methodological positions, ranging from Comtean positivism to Rankean
historicism.
Next to this epistemological claim, however, academic history always
claimed to fulfil a practical function, namely, to provide a certain degree of
guidance in practical life, and this constituted its Orientierungsanspruch, its
claim to practical orientation.2 For most professional historians over much of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this practical orientation was about
creating some kind of identification with the state, most often the nation-state.
This was no accident since the professionalisation of academic history was
very much a state affair; most professional historians were literally fed by the
state. Not without justification, then, have historians been called ‘priests of the
state’. 
In the following article I shall analyse McNeill’s argument in order to
show the fundamental and unresolved opposition between its epistemological
and its practical claims. I shall argue that the practical claims undermine the
epistemological claims in a manner that is characteristic of scientific history
from the early nineteenth century onwards. The stronger its epistemological
claims, the weaker its practical claims – and vice versa. 
I shall start by arguing that McNeill tries to bridge the opposition between
his epistemological and practical claims in two ways. On the one hand, he
projects the practical aims onto the process of history itself and thus ‘objectifies’
them. This strategy of ‘hardening’ the practical goals by ‘objectifying’ has
characterised scientific history since its foundation. The other strategy used by
McNeill to bridge the opposition between history’s epistemological and
practical aims, however, consists of ‘softening up’ the epistemological claims of
scientific history by integrating its practical goals into the ‘soft’ and ‘subjective’
aspects of historical epistemology. In this respect scientific history has seen the
notions of ‘narrative’, ‘meaning’ and ‘interpretation’ turn into the loci within
which practical ‘meaning’ is situated. Hayden White’s attempt in Metahistory to
connect specific types of ideological content to specific narrative forms is the
logical endpoint of this train of thought (although it should be noted that
McNeill’s notion of ‘mythistory’ is not indebted to White). Nevertheless, the
question of whether narrative history can claim to represent truth is as
fundamental for McNeill’s ‘mythistory’ as it is for White’s Metahistory.3
After having reconstructed the birth of ‘mythistory’, I shall go on to
analyse the notion of myth itself in order to establish its relationship to the
concept of history. This will lead us to an examination of the anthropological
Drawing the Line 37
debate regarding myth and its functions, including myths of the nation.
Thirdly, I shall raise the question of whether the nation itself can be seen as a
myth. This question is fundamental for the historical credentials of ‘scientific’
history, because ‘scientific’ historians have been the prime academic
constructors of nations. Finally, I shall go back to the writings of Ranke and
Von Humboldt in order to locate the origins of ‘scientific’ history’s
epistemological difficulties. Paradoxically, it will turn out that McNeill’s
problem of drawing the line between ‘scientific’ history and myth was already
embedded in the project of ‘scientific’ history itself.
From ‘Scientific’ History to ‘Mythistory’
Myth and history are close kin inasmuch as both explain how things got to be the
way they are by telling some sort of story. But our common parlance reckons
myth to be false while history is, or aspires to be, true. Accordingly, a historian
who rejects someone else’s conclusions calls them mythical, while claiming that
his own views are true. However, what seems true to one historian will seem false
to another, so one historian’s truth becomes another’s myth, even at the moment
of utterance.4
With these intriguing sentences McNeill opens his article, and the rest of it he
devotes to answering the delicate question of how scientific history got into its
current predicament, with scientific historians regarding each others’ histories
as ‘mythical’ and truth increasingly being ‘privatised’ rather than becoming
universal. 
This situation is all the more puzzling because the original rationale of
scientific history was to replace myths about the past with true stories. Almost
all of the treatises about ‘scientific’ history produced by nineteenth-century
historians abound in statements about exchanging mythical, fraudulent,
‘amateur’ and/or ‘artistic’ efforts for true reconstructions.5 Almost all histories
of historiography also argue that ‘myth’ is something scientific history left
behind long ago, usually locating the break somewhere between the seventeenth
and the nineteenth century (with Herodotus and Thucydides being habitually
cited as its Greek precursors).6 Take Collingwood for instance, who
characterises myth in contrast to history, which deals with human actions
localised in time and space, as follows: 
Myth […] is not concerned with human actions at all. The human element has
been completely purged away and the characters of the story are simply gods.
And the divine actions that are recorded are not dated events in the past: they are
conceived of as having occurred in the past, indeed, but in a dateless past which
is so remote that nobody knows when it was. It is outside all our time reckoning
and called ‘the beginning of things’. Hence, when a myth is couched in what
seems a temporal shape, because it relates events one of which follows another in
a temporal shape, the shape is not strictly speaking temporal, it is quasi-temporal.7
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According to Collingwood, history is only concerned with temporally dated
human actions and is thus the opposite of myth, which deals with gods acting
in times beyond temporal markers. 
What had happened to the project of ‘scientific’ history since it first took
flight, full of self-confidence? McNeill, who initially shared the traditional
historians’ aversion to methodology, formulates the following answer:
although scientific history had made great progress since the beginning of the
nineteenth century by transcending pre-existing divisions, such as those
resulting from religious controversies, it had failed in generating a consensus
comparable to that found in the natural sciences.8 He offers two explanations
for this state of affairs. Firstly, although many individual facts in history can be
established beyond reasonable doubt, history cannot be reduced to individual
facts: ‘To become a history, facts have to be put together into a pattern that is
understandable and credible […]. In order to make facts “understandable”, the
historian imputes “meaning” to them, and in order to make them credible the
historian has to take account of the expectations of the audience he or she is
addressing’.9 So McNeill explains the absence of an epistemological consensus
among historians by the fact that historians connect historical facts in
meaningful patterns – alias narratives – and that these meaningful patterns have
no general epistemic validity, because their credibility is restricted to specific
audiences (as was the case in the rhetorical tradition).
Secondly, McNeill presents the reflexivity of these (symbolically
structured) meaning patterns as an explanation for the absence of consensus in
history. His argument is as follows: 
The great and obvious difference between natural scientists and historians is the
greater complexity of the behavior historians seek to understand. The principal
source of historical complexity lies in the fact that human beings react both to the
natural world and to one another chiefly through the mediation of symbols. This
means, among other things, that any theory about human life, if widely believed,
will actually alter actual behavior, usually by inducing people to act as if the theory
were true. Ideas and ideals thus become self-validating within remarkably elastic
limits […]. The price of this achievement is the elastic, inexact character of truth,
and especially of truths about human conduct.10
Therefore, McNeill’s second explanation for the absence of consensus in
history is the reflexivity of ‘theories about human life’, because this type of
‘theory’ alters human conduct itself. McNeill thus makes no fundamental
distinction between the (‘first order’) ‘theories about human life’ of historical
actors themselves and those (‘second order’) theories developed by historians
ex post facto. His argument seems to be that both kinds of ‘theory’ may turn
into self-fulfilling prophecies (he may have been thinking of theories like
nationalism or racism, although he does not mention them).
According to McNeill, ‘shared truths’ are necessary in order for groups
and cultures to survive, because they create in-group solidarity and function as
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a group’s ‘social cement’. Sects, religions, tribes and states from the Sumer to
modern times have all based their identity and cohesion on ‘shared truths’ in
the form of shared beliefs, ideals and traditions. Here McNeill seems to lump
together any collective belief system under the heading of ‘shared truths’,
including all kinds of belief about the past. ‘Yet to outsiders, truths of this kind
are likely to seem myths […] because different groups usually have different
versions of the truth about themselves and in all likelihood this sort of social
and ideological fragmentation will continue indefinitely’.11
Is there any uncontested place for historical truth in this fragmented
world? It is clear that McNeill, who refers to the ‘truth’ of ‘meaning patterns’
or narratives produced by historians and not the truth of historical factual
statements, answers this question in the negative, because the idea that
‘scientific method’ would create a consensus among ‘professional’ historians
has turned out to be just ‘a recent example of such a belief system’: ‘Choice is
everywhere; dissent turns into cacophonous confusion; my truth dissolves into
your myth even before I can put words on paper’.12
However, he then, quite surprisingly given the logic of his argument,
states that he is ‘not ready to abandon’ his liberal faith that in the free
marketplace of ideas ‘truth will eventually prevail’, notwithstanding the
present confusion.13 Still, the same logic forces him to qualify his own appeal
to the ‘liberal’ idea of truth as just another ‘faith’, so in the end the regulative
idea of truth for him is subject to a ‘take it or leave it’ approach, rather than
forming a constitutive principle of ‘scientific’ history as such. In this respect
McNeill’s standpoint can be likened to that of a postmodernist manqué, who
in the end recoils from the conclusion of his own argument.
At this point in his argument McNeill constructs a bridge in his analysis
between the ‘fragmented’ epistemological universe in which it is hard, if not
impossible, to draw a line between myth and truth, and a ‘fragmented’
normative universe. Large numbers of people, ranging from Iranian Moslems
to American sectarians (religious and otherwise), ‘exhibit symptoms of acute
distress in the face of moral uncertainties, generated by exposure to competing
myths’. The result of these worldwide moral uncertainties is ‘an intensified
personal attachment, first to national, and then to sub-national groups, each
with its distinct ideals and practices’. This moral fragmentation also pertains
to historians because ‘the historical profession faithfully reflected and helped
to forward these shifts of sentiment’. Women’s, black and postcolonial history
have been booming ever since.14
Like any postmodernist worth his salt, McNeill does not buy into the
professional ideology according to which ‘professionalisation equals
objectivity’, and neither does he have a fundamental problem with disciplinary
fragmentation.15 Given the history of ‘scientific’ history, he regards the moral
and practical allegiances of historians to specific groups as only natural: ‘Such
activity confronted our traditional professional role of helping to define
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collective identities in ambiguous situations. Consciousness of a common past,
after all, is a powerful supplement to other ways of defining who “we” are.’16
Historians have in fact always been active in defining boundaries between
an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’.17 National historiography is the best known genre in
point, Herodotus providing the model with his emphasis on the supreme value
of political freedom within a territorially defined state. Because all human
groups like to be flattered rather than criticised, historians are ‘under perpetual
pressure to conform to expectations by portraying the people they write about
in a positive light; and a mingling of truth and falsehood, blending history with
ideology, results’.18 Most national and group history is of this nature, according
to McNeill, although the precise mixture of detachment and emotional
involvement varies with every historian; ‘truth, persuasiveness, intelligibility
rest far more on this level of the historian’s art than on source criticism’.19
McNeill’s distinction between source criticism and the ‘art’ of putting the
facts together in credible ‘meaning patterns’ or narratives goes back to Ranke,
as we shall see, although the exact relationship between both activities has
received very little attention either from historians or philosophers of history.
Yet the identity-constructing and identity-enhancing aspects of history writing
are essential to the whole enterprise, because ‘myths’ of this sort are self-
validating and enhance the chances of the ‘survival’ of groups, especially
during conflicts. Therefore, the historian has no choice but to choose: ‘Where
to fix one’s loyalties is the supreme question of human life, and is especially
acute in a cosmopolitan age like ours when choices abound.’20
What McNeill presents here is what we could call an observational theory
characteristic of a historian. He presents the theory as a description of ‘how it
actually is’: according to him, the world just is both cosmopolitan and
fundamentally fragmented – and so is the discipline of history.21 His next
move is to connect his cognitive observational theory to a normative theory of
the practical function of history. In true Kantian spirit McNeill concludes that
in our cosmopolitan age the only realistic and morally acceptable option for
the historian is to pledge his loyalty to humanity as a whole: 
Instead of enhancing conflicts, as parochial historiography inevitably does, an
intelligible world history might be expected to diminish the lethality of group
encounters by cultivating a sense of individual identification with the triumphs
and tribulations of humanity as a whole. This, indeed, strikes me as the moral duty
of the historical profession in our time. We need to develop an ecumenical
history, with plenty of room for human diversity in all its complexity.22
This transition from the cognitive to the normative level is a typical
methodological move for a historian, and dates back to the origins of
‘scientific’ history. The basic mechanism supporting the transition is the
projection of the normatively preferred process onto the ‘factual’ process of
history itself, which leads to the ‘objectification’ of these processes. In this
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way, the historians of the nation-state simply identified history itself with the
genesis and development of nation-states, just as the historians of class
struggle simply identified history itself with the genesis and development of
class struggles. Remarkably, even historians who advocate ‘the postmodern
condition’ have actually identified history itself with the genesis and
development of this ‘condition’.23 Taking a normative position, such as
furthering the cause of the nation, furthering the cause of one class in the class
struggle, or furthering the ‘postmodern condition’, is then represented as being
a more or less cognitive step, simply a matter of ‘reading the sign of the times’
or ‘riding the waves of history’. 
McNeill is aware that world history is still a suspicious genre for most
historians because they think that truth only resides in the documents. World
history, with its reliance on literature rather than archival sources, is therefore
often regarded as necessarily vague or even ‘unhistorical’. According to
McNeill, this is mere prejudice, but fortunately the historian’s practice is often
better than his epistemology. With a more reflective epistemology it is not
hard to attain ‘a better historiographical balance between Truth, truths and
myth’.24
Since Eternal Truth is not the stuff of human affairs, Truth with a capital
T can be discarded. However, McNeill argues that 
Truths with a small t are what historians achieve when they bend their minds as
critically and carefully as they can to the task of making their account of public
affairs credible as well as intelligible to an audience that shares enough of their
particular outlook and assumptions to accept what they say. The result may be
called mythistory […].25
For McNeill, then, truths in history depend for their status on their plausibility
for a particular audience, and are not universal. Therefore, truths in history are
multiple, although this does not mean that one mythistory is as good as another:
‘Some clearly are more adequate to the facts than others’26 in terms of temporal
and spatial scope, range and accuracy. As we have seen, historiography has, by
and large, made progress in this respect according to McNeill’s liberal
conviction, so that ‘to be a truth-seeking mythographer is […] a high and
serious calling’.27 So in the end, and quite remarkably, McNeill still appeals to
(Popperian) epistemic criteria when it comes to evaluating different species of
‘mythistory’, probably because he knows that in any ‘scientific’ discourse
overtly normative arguments tend to blow up in one’s face. So, at the very end
of his argument, McNeill once again turns back at the sight of its logical
consequences, preferring to sail his boat into a reassuringly safe ‘scientific’
harbour. How the epistemic criteria of scope and accuracy are supposed to
function in a fundamentally ‘fragmented’ scientific universe remains unclear,
alas. His decision to prevent his postmodern flirt with the notion of myth from
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developing into a full-blown relationship at the moment suprême thus comes at
a price – the price of his argument’s consistency.
All in all, with the notion of ‘mythistory’ the traditional rationale of
‘scientific’ history remains at stake, because the demarcation between
scientific, methodical truth and myth constituted the very rationale of
‘scientific’ history in the first place. By blurring the line between scientific
history and myth, it is no longer clear whether there is any distinction, and if
so, what this distinction is. What is now called for, then, is a clarification of the
notion of myth.
What is Myth? Myth from the Ancient Greeks to the Present
In her overview of the notion of myth the anthropologist Joanna Overing
immediately identifies the problem McNeill has raised in his concept of
‘mythistory’: 
The first relevant question in the study of myth is: how do we know that something
falls within the genre of myth? How do we categorise this, but not that, as myth?
Why, for instance, should we decide to use the term ‘myth’ and not ‘history’ in
describing a particular piece of discourse? Whether in the context of Amazonia or
Eastern Europe, the boundaries between myth and history are not clear, and one
reason for this is that the category of myth is not easily defined. We might perhaps
say that the use of the term ‘myth’ is more a judgmental than a definitional or
propositional procedure: its attribution requires a judgment having to do with
standards of knowledge and its organisation.28
Myth, according to Overing, owes its bad reputation to Greek philosophy, in
which it was identified with a category of fictional discourse at some point
between the eighth and the fourth century BC ‘Myth or mythos became
understood as a form of speech opposed to reasoned discourse or logos. As
such myth became defined as opposed to both truth (myth is fiction) and to the
rational (myth is absurd).’29 Both the historian Thucydides and the philosopher
Plato identified myth with ‘old wives’ tales, the fabulous and the marvellous –
the opposite of truthful discourse. 
Earlier on, myth had possessed a more positive ring, with a capacity both
to express the fundamental truths of existence and a capacity to give pleasure
and to involve the emotional participation of an audience. These qualities
ensured myth’s power to captivate an audience and to be effective. McNeill
attributed these same characteristics to ‘mythistory’. So, in short, all the major
oppositions associated with the notion of myth today go back to the rationalist
oppositions of Greek antiquity: the opposition between mythos and logos,
between the contextual and the universal, between the absurd and the logical,
the emotional and the rational.30 These oppositions were all reproduced by
nineteenth-century anthropology, which turned myths into its object of
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inquiry: mythos was taken to be evidence of barbarian, primitive cultures,
while logos was exclusively attributed to Western civilisation. 
While anthropologists took primitive cultures as their object of enquiry,
they studied other people’s myths – people’s fictive constructions of reality or
‘phantom realities’, to use the phrase of Overing. Thus, like the ancient Greeks,
nineteenth-century anthropologists, and their successors well into the twentieth
century, continued to view mythology as fictive, consisting of fabulous, untrue
stories about unreal gods and heroes that erroneously explained a people’s past
to them.31 Anthropology acknowledged the rationality of the ‘savage mind’, but
it did not acknowledge the truth claims embedded in the savage ‘worldviews’.
It could not, for instance, accommodate such ‘primitive’ ideas as the concept of
rain being caused by urinating gods, within the rational Newtonian universe.
The classical demarcation between the mythical ‘reality of the really
made-up’ of ‘primitive’ people and our ‘real’, scientifically known reality,
however, has recently been questioned by anthropologists (just as McNeill
did for history). Marshall Sahlins argued in his Islands of History (1985) that
in Polynesian culture the distinction between (fictitious) myth and (real)
history does not hold water: myths in Polynesian culture are the key to its
cosmology and its conception of history. Overing makes the very same point
with regard to the Piaroa-tribe in Amazonia: their mythical gods are part of
their narratives about their history; and their mythical time does not belong to
a closed past, but rather remains omnipresent. Furthermore, she argues that
the Piaroa live within an evaluative universe, quite unlike the Western one, in
which ‘nature’ is not a separate domain to be subjugated and controlled by
humans: ‘All postulates about reality in an evaluative universe, including
those about physical reality, are tied explicitly to a moral universe.’32
Therefore, Overing refers to the ‘truth of myths’ in this cosmological sense –
very much in the sense in which McNeill was referring to the ‘shared truths’
essential for every culture: ‘Myths simply express and deal with a people’s
reality postulates about the world, and mythic truths pertain more to a moral
universe of meaning than to a “natural” one (in the sense of the physical
unitary world of the scientist). For those educated within a Western tradition,
myth is a strange place indeed to discover “truth”’33 – although not for
McNeill, as we have observed.
Next to the nebulous dividing line between myth and history, there is a
second issue raised by Overing that is pertinent to McNeill’s argument about
identity-construction by history. This is what one could call the performative
function of myths in making the distinction between identity and difference,
between an ‘Us’ and a ‘Them’. Myths contain heroic stories about the origins
and fate of specific communities and as such express images of selfhood by
stating sets of identity criteria for a community. In this way myths help
constitute communities’ distinctness from others by creating boundaries.34
Often these images of selfhood are simultaneously based on images of
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threatening and despised others as their ‘alien’ Doppelgänger, as Schöpflin
argues. So myths create communities by demonising others, although the
degree of this demonisation can vary.35 McNeill proposed an identical thesis
with regard to history.
The third and final aspect of myth pertinent to McNeill’s argument is the
solidarity function of myth connected to the performative function just
mentioned. Next to boundary creation, the role of myth in solidarity creation,
through rituals, liturgies and symbols, is essential: ‘The outcome of
participation in ritual and, therefore, of accepting that one’s relationship to the
community is structured by myth, is the strengthening of both the collectivity
and the individual’s role in it […] The common participation in ritual produces
bonds of solidarity without demanding uniformity of belief. People can act
together without consensus.’36 Myth thus works on a pre-rational and
emotional level that is crucial to its functioning. However, in order to fulfill
this function myth must somehow resonate in ‘collective memories’, and
therefore cannot be ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ at will. Remarkably, McNeill
made the very same points for history: he argued that histories are necessary
for the solidarity and ‘survival’ of communities, and are dependent on their
acceptance by a particular audience, which is in turn dependent on the
compatibility of their presuppositions with their organising concepts.37
So, comparing Overing’s and Schöpflin’s analysis of myth with
McNeill’s analysis of history – which resulted in the introduction of the
paradoxical notion of ‘mythistory’ – we have to draw the conclusion that on
first inspection the dividing line between myth and history does not seem to
hold or is, at best, imperceptibly thin. This would imply that we have to face
the possibility that ‘scientific’ history is not only engaged in ‘myth-breaking’,
but also in ‘myth-making’ – a conclusion already drawn by postmodernists.
And, of course, the image of ‘scientific’ history would only get worse with the
deconstruction of the privileged object of ‘scientific’ history since the latter
half of the nineteenth-century itself – the nation – as a myth. This is exactly the
predicament historians have found themselves in over the last decade or so.38
Is the Nation a Myth?
The importance of the question of whether the nation is also a myth – a ‘self-
validating’ myth in McNeill’s terms – can hardly be overestimated because
since the nineteenth century ‘scientific’ historians have been among the prime
architects of nations and of nation-states. If the answer is yes, there are even
more compelling grounds to categorise ‘scientific’ history as ‘mythistory’ than
those McNeill adduced, because he did not specifically address national
history. ‘Myth-making’ – horribile dictu – may even have formed a greater
part of the activity of scientific historians than ‘myth breaking’.39
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In the literature on nationalism, the dominant constructivist positions à la
Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm definitely seem to back up the thesis
that national historians have been ‘mythmakers’ par excellence. The notion
that nations are ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson) which again are
dependent on ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm/Ranger), essentially identifies
national historians as the main protagonists in the processes of ‘imagining’
and ‘inventing’. By the same token, all essentialist notions of the nation
developed from the early nineteenth century onwards can be deconstructed as
the cognitive strategies of ‘scientific’ historians to cover up their own
‘imagining’ and ‘inventing’ practices. Anti-constructivist positions like that of
Anthony D. Smith nowadays appear to be no more than footnotes to their
constructivist counterparts, in the sense that they only emphasise that nations
cannot be ‘imagined’ and ‘invented’ at will (because ‘imagined’ nations are
only effective if they ‘resonate’ with something ‘real’).40
Also important in this context is the fact that constructivist authors have
emphasised that the nation is not only an ‘imagined’, but also an ‘emotional’
community, that is ‘produced’ and ‘staged’ using the same cultural
mechanisms, metaphors and practices as religion.41 Therefore, nationalism is
directly linked to the Christian religion, and there are good reasons to interpret
nationalism as the ‘nationalisation’ of Christianity (and this will take us to the
very origins of ‘scientific’ history in Ranke and Von Humboldt, as we shall
see in the next section). Like religion, the nation is produced through rituals,
cults and myths.42 Religion’s central values, love, sacrifice and death, are also
those of the nation. Moreover, love is easily transformed into hatred towards
those outside the community, while fallen soldiers are often represented as the
‘incarnation of the nation’.43 Both religious and national cults are centred on
a sacred dogma and a sacred object – God and The Nation. Both have sacred
symbols and both have a fixed calendar and fixed places for their cult-rituals
– churches and national monuments. The international academic boom of
lieux de mémoire projects derives its impetus from this analogy.
Both cults also worship special persons, who are regarded as ‘mediators’
between the world of the sacred and the world of the profane – in religious cults
these special persons are saints and martyrs, and in national cults they are
national heroes, especially those who founded The Nation and those who
sacrificed their lives for it. In both cults, violent death in defence of the Sacred
Cause is represented as worthy and meaningful – as a sacrifice – because it helps
the community in question to continue its existence. In both cults, we therefore
usually encounter a cult of the dead. Both cults essentially define moral
communities that define the borders of human solidarity, using similar
vocabularies (with central notions like ‘cult’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘eternity’,
‘incarnation’, ‘salvation’, ‘martyrdom’, ‘communion’ and ‘resurrection’).44 It is
no accident, therefore, that Schöpflin in his taxonomy of myths also emphasised
the Christian semantic structure of the national myths of redemption and
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suffering, the national myths of election and the civilising mission, the national
myths of rebirth and renewal, and the national myth of a shared descent.45
One could argue on the basis of these overwhelming similarities that the
case for ‘mythistory’ in national history is very convincing. Etienne Francois
and Hagen Schulze recently summarised the general verdict on nineteenth-
century ‘scientific’ national history as follows: 
Was the nineteenth century not a period in which everyone – historians,
politicians and public opinion – was convinced that historical science had to be
pursued with the aim of making it an objective science as opposed to the myths
which it would destroy by bringing the whole truth about the past out into the
daylight? […] The result was that too often national myths have been dressed up
as scientific truth.46
The diagnosis only gets worse when one realises that much twentieth-
century national history was no better than its nineteenth-century counterpart.
So, all in all, ‘scientific’ history has never known where to draw the line
between myth-making and myth-breaking, and ‘scientific’ national historians
have themselves been very active in helping to construct the myth of the
nation while simultaneously deriving their ‘scientific’ legitimacy from a
discourse of ‘myth-breaking’. The very marginality of the history of
historiography within the historical discipline – implying a very limited
interest on the part of ‘scientific’ historians in their own history – may
plausibly be interpreted as a professional mechanism in order to repress this
threatening past. ‘Don’t look back’ still seems the safest strategy for
everybody with an unsettling past – including ‘scientific’ historians.47
The Source of the Troubles: Troubles at the Source
The foregoing discussion, then, has given ‘scientific’ history something of a
pounding, as McNeill’s proposal to rename ‘history’ as ‘mythistory’ has gone
pretty much unchallenged (even if it contains some internal inconsistencies
that need to be resolved). Our short investigation into the history of the
concept of myth seems to support McNeill’s diagnosis, as myth and history
were found to be fulfilling essentially the same function, and anthropologists
are no longer either able or willing to draw a fundamental line between history
and myth. 
Our inquiry into the debate about nations and nationalism pointed in
precisely the same direction: national histories constructed by ‘scientific’
historians in the nineteenth-century have been deconstructed in recent decades
as thoroughly mythical. The emotional function of national history,
emphasised by the constructivists’ contribution to this debate, only added
extra force to the thesis that it is impossible to draw a firm line between
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national history and national mythology. The same could be said about the
observation that striking similarities exist between discursive structures and
practices relating to the nation and religion.48 The recent debate about the
Europe-wide phenomenon of Volksgeschichte in the twentieth century clearly
suggests that the problem did not disappear in 1900, or after 1945.49 The
nation, in short, appears to be a prime example of the ‘self-validating’ type of
myth revealed by McNeill’s analysis, and in this capacity it may still be with
us today.
The question that now needs to be addressed in this last section, then, is
where the crisis of ‘scientific’ history comes from and whether there is any
reason to hope that it will go away. There are two answers to this question: one
reassuring and one rather alarming. The reassuring answer is that all debate
and insecurity about the ‘scientific’ status of history is due to the fashionable
and temporarily unsettling influences of postmodernism, feminism and
multiculturalism.50 This answer has, for obvious reasons, been the most
popular one among ‘scientific’ historians.51 Moreover, as historians know very
well, there is always a ‘post-’ to every ‘post-’, and it is just a matter of time
until ‘post-postmodernism’ will solve the crisis of ‘scientific’ history. 
The more alarming answer, however, is that the crisis of ‘scientific’
history is not just a temporary phenomenon, but is built into the foundations
of scientific history itself. Here I will argue for this second answer and I will
do so by showing that the problem of ‘mythistory’ is already traceable in the
writings of two of the ‘fathers’ of ‘scientific’ history, Leopold von Ranke and
Wilhelm von Humboldt.
For those who are used to identifying Ranke with the critical method and
the critical method with empiricism in history, the idea of looking for the
origins of the ‘myth problem’ in Ranke would probably seem a strange idea.
In the US the ‘empiricist’ reading of Ranke is most common, but it is certainly
not restricted to that country alone. In their introduction to an English edition
of Ranke’s selected writings, Georg Iggers and Konrad von Moltke have
flagged up this problem. Ranke’s famous dictum that historians should write
‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’, based on the application of the critical method,
has usually been misinterpreted as an advocacy of hardboiled ‘empiricism’,
implying a restriction of scientific history to ‘the facts’. This interpretation,
however, is completely wrongheaded because it misses what Ranke meant by
‘eigentlich’: ‘It is not factuality, but the emphasis on the essential that makes
an account historical.’52 And what Ranke regarded as essential in history was
not established by the critical method, but only by his Ideenlehre – his
idealistic theory of history, which functioned as his interpretative framework
or observational theory. 
According to this (Neoplatonic) theory, history was a process in which
specific immanent ideas were present, realising themselves in the form of
forces. States, religions and languages were such ideas, and Ranke saw each
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particular state, religion and language as a manifestation of such an idea, in the
process of realising itself in a struggle against others – especially through the
actions of ‘great men’, who were able to grasp the ideas of their time, the
Zeitgeist.53 The capacity to intuitively ‘grasp’ (‘Ahnen’, ‘Divination’) the ideas
immanent in history was at least as essential for scientific history as the mastery
of the critical method, because the factual establishment of events does not as
yet constitute history for Ranke and von Humboldt. Only by connecting
established facts to their immanent ideas, and thus by creating their meaningful
unity – their geistige Einheit or their essential Zusammenhang – ‘scientific’
history was born. 
Now both von Ranke and the other founders of the German Historical
School of Historismus emphasised the ‘theoretical’, non-empirical aspect of
scientific history as one of its two defining characteristics. Characteristically, the
opening sentences of Ranke’s early treatise On the Character of Historical
Science read: ‘History is distinguished from all other sciences in that it is also an
art. History is a science in collecting, finding, penetrating; it is an art because it
recreates and portrays that which it has found and recognised. Other sciences are
satisfied simply with recording what has been found; history requires the ability
to recreate.’54
Humboldt’s equally famous treatise On the Historian’s Task (1821)
emphasises the ‘theoretical’, non-empirical aspect of scientific history even
more clearly than Ranke: ‘The historian’s task is to present what actually
happened. […] An event, however, is only partially visible in the world of the
senses; the rest has to be added by intuition, inference, and guesswork.’55 The
facts are just the ‘raw material, but not history itself. […] The truth of any
event is predicated on the addition – mentioned above – of that invisible part
of every fact, and it is this part, therefore, which the historian has to add.
Regarded in this way, he does become active, even creative […].’56
So both von Ranke and von Humboldt emphasised that interpretative
activity, based on the Ideenlehre, was as essential for ‘scientific’ history as the
critical method itself and that to ignore this aspect of the historian’s activity ‘is
to miss the essence of truth itself’.57 No wonder that Johan-Gustav Droysen,
whose Historik is the first book-length treatise on historical method in the
tradition of Historismus, also presented source criticism as merely a first step
towards establishing the facts, the ‘interpretation of ideas’ being the real
interpretative accomplishment of scientific history.58
I have gone back to the very origins of ‘scientific’ history in Germany
because here we find the origins of the problems McNeill is raising. This
holds both for the problem of history’s scientific status and for history’s
practical status. First, for Ranke and Von Humboldt ‘scientific’ history
consisted both in the application of the critical method in order to establish
‘true’ facts and in the ‘creative’ or ‘artistic’ interpretation of the facts on the
basis of their Ideenlehre in order to connect them and bring out their actual
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‘meaning’. Ranke and von Humboldt actually regarded these ideas as active
forces (Kräfte) immanent in history itself, and therefore by projecting their
(Neoplatonic) theory onto reality, they treated it as if it were no different from
historical reality.59 What is remarkable, though, from our present point of
view, is that their awareness of the ‘theoretical’ nature of history writing was
not matched by an awareness of a plurality of possible theories. Therefore, all
the epistemological problems of ‘scientific’ historians who realise that reality
can be approached and interpreted through different theories not universally
shared, are simply absent from the writings of Ranke and Von Humboldt. Of
course, the explanation for their ‘blindness’ in this respect is that their
Ideenlehre was not just a ‘theory’ for them, but their Christian worldview.
Religious ‘myth’, therefore, was built into the foundations of ‘scientific’
history itself, and therefore it is small wonder that their ideas were ‘reduced’
by an empiricist reading later on. 
So, although Ranke and Von Humboldt – contrary to most of their
twentieth-century scions – were conscious of the fact that ‘scientific’ history
was based not only on a (critical) method, but also on a theory, they simply
failed to consider the possibility of other theories than the Ideenlehre and the
epistemological problems resulting from the presence of several theories.
What an epistemologically conscious ‘scientific’ history would have needed
from its beginning, therefore, was a reflection on how to compare different
theories and narratives with each other, and a reflection on how to evaluate
their different epistemological and practical qualities. 
This ‘omission’ at the very origin of ‘scientific’ history has had serious
consequences for its later development, because those historians, who would
later recognise the plurality of theories and narratives, lacked the theoretical
tools and the theoretical justification to compare and evaluate them rationally.
As a consequence of this theoretical Leerstelle the reflection on the
preferences for and the evaluation of theories in history became
‘subjectivised’ and was conceived of in terms of the individual ‘historical
imagination’ or of ‘an act of faith’.60 Historical theory, if recognised at all, was
thus positioned outside the domain of rational, epistemological discourse.
Seen in this light we can conclude – perhaps a little maliciously – that the
‘scientific’ history of Ranke and Von Humboldt was ‘mythical’ from its
inception. ‘Mythistory’ finally turns out to be not a specific Geburtsfehler
(failure at birth), but the birth of ‘scientific’ history itself.61
Unlike Ranke and Von Humboldt, McNeill expressly identifies scientific
history with establishing facts by the critical method, and he thus exemplifies the
‘empiricist’ reduction of Ranke which Iggers and Von Moltke have commented
upon. Owing to this ‘empiricist’ interpretation, McNeill only encounters the
problems which will lead him to formulate the notion of ‘mythistory’ when he
observes that history requires more from historians than just establishing the
facts: these problems typically arise when he introduces the notion of ‘meaning’
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(or ‘interpretation’), which was still part and parcel of Ranke’s conception of
Geschichtswissenschaft.62
The scope of the notion of Wissenschaft had of course narrowed
substantially between 1820 and 1985, resulting among other things in the
‘expulsion’ of the act of interpretation from the ground it had held during the
reign of empiricism – only to make a triumphant return following the demise of
empiricism as the dominant philosophy of science in the 1960s. Still under the
spell of empiricism, however, McNeill equates science with consensus, and a
science which is at the same time an art, as history was for Ranke, is no longer
a life option for McNeill.63 Therefore, his insight that ‘interpretation’ is just as
essential for ‘scientific’ history as a critical method, constitutes a problem for
McNeill, while it was still something of a truism for Ranke and Von Humboldt.
Therefore, McNeill’s acknowledgement that ‘scientific’ history, as a
consequence of subjective ‘interpretation’, is characterised by an obvious
absence of consensus leads him to the conclusion that history must be something
less than a ‘science’ – and for this ‘hybrid’ he coins the term ‘mythistory’. Small
wonder, then, that Ranke’s well-known ideas about the ‘impartiality’ and
‘objectivity’ of the historian are not even mentioned by McNeill.64 ‘Mythistory’,
an apparent contradictio in adjecto within the framework of ‘scientific’ history,
is the logical end station of this train of argument.
McNeill’s second reason for re-labelling history as ‘mythistory’ is related
to its practical, reflexive function: all histories, being ‘theories of human
behaviour’, influence human action and may even turn into self-fulfilling
prophecies – the ‘myth of the nation’ included. This argument has no corollary
in Ranke and Humboldt, because according to their theory the course of history
ultimately is not so much determined by the intentions of human actors, but by
God. Therefore, self-fulfilling prophecies do not fit into their framework and
are not subjected to scrutiny. Yet Ranke and Humboldt nevertheless justify
history’s practical function through their observational theory. 
According to Humboldt, 
the historian, in order to perform the task of his profession, has to compose the
narrative of events in such a way that the reader’s emotions will be stirred by it as
if by reality itself. It is in this way that history is related to active life. History does
not primarily serve us by showing us through specific examples, often misleading
and rarely enlightening, what to do and what to avoid. History’s true and
immeasurable usefulness lies rather in its power to enliven and refine our sense of
acting on reality, and this occurs more though the form attached to events than
through the events themselves […] [T]here is no successful intervention in the
flow of events except by clearly recognising the truth of the predominating trend
of ideas at a given time and by adhering to this truth with determination.65
In short, history’s practical function is guaranteed for Ranke and
Humboldt by the fact that historians, by showing the ‘actual’ reality of events
– their ‘essence’, so to speak, stripped of what is merely ‘accidental’ – enable
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readers to see the ‘trend’ and to act accordingly. In their view historians could
only show their readers tidal movements and waves of history, and the only
practical choice human beings had was either to ride the waves or be swept
away by them. Given this view, they could not foresee that ‘scientific’ history
itself might ever be among the victims.
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